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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1968, terrorists have carried out over 14,000 attacks 
worldwide.1  The United States was virtually free of such incidents 
until 1993, when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center for the 
first time.2  Not only has international terrorism arrived in the 
United States, but domestic terrorism has increased as well.3  The 
rise of terrorist activity in the United States, culminating in the 
        † Richard Allyn is a partner at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, LLP.
        ††   Heather McNeff is an associate at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, LLP.
1. James G. Rizzo, Tragedy’s Aftermath: The Impact of 9/11 on the Insurance
Industry, 46 BOSTON B.J. 10, 12 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.  Two high profile examples of domestic terrorism are the Oklahoma
City Federal Building bombing in 1995 and the nightclub bombing in Atlanta
during the 1996 Olympics.  Id.
1
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September 11 attack, has had an undeniable impact on the
insurance industry.4
This article will examine the impact of September 11 on the 
insurance industry.  Part II will examine the state of terrorism 
insurance before September 11.  Part III will address the effect of 
September 11 on the insurance industry.  Part IV will discuss the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.
II. TERRORISM INSURANCE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11
A. Policy Language
Before the September 11 attack, terrorism in the United States 
was nearly unheard of.  Accordingly, insurers gave little thought to 
coverage for terrorism.  Few policies contained express terrorism 
exclusions.  The exclusion that arguably came closest to excluding 
terrorism was the war risk exclusion.  A typical war risk exclusion 
stated that the policy would not cover damage due to:
(1) hostile or warlike action in time of peace or war, 
including action in hindering, combating or defending 
against an actual, impending or expected attack (a) by 
any government or sovereign power (de jure or de facto), 
or by any authority maintaining or using military, naval or 
air forces; or (b) by military, naval or air forces; or (c) by 
an agent of any such government, power, authority or 
forces, it being understood that any discharge, explosion 
or use of any weapon of war employing nuclear fission or 
fusion shall be conclusively presumed to be such a hostile 
or warlike action by such government, power, authority or 
forces;
(2) insurrection, rebellion, revolution, civil war, usurped 
power, or action taken by governmental authority in
hindering, combating or defending against such an
occurrence; seizure or destruction under quarantine or 
custom’s regulations, confiscation by order of any
government or public authority, or risk of contraband or 
illegal trade.5
4. The impact of the September 11 attack on the insurance industry has 
been more than economic.  Marsh & McLennan and Aon, two of the largest 
insurance brokers in the United States, lost 295 and 200 employees respectively in 
the World Trade Center attack. Insurance and Terrorism, Hearing Before the House 
Financial Services Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John T. Sinnott, 
Chairman and CEO, Marsh, Inc.).
5. STEVEN A. COZEN, INSURING REAL PROPERTY app. 7f-15 (2000) (ISO Form 
2
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The war risk exclusion was designed to prevent insurers from 
having to cover large losses from war and correlated warlike
activities.6  War usually causes widespread damage to many
policyholders within a region over an extended period, making it 
costly for insurers to cover.7
B. Case Law
Prior to September 11 only one case, Pan American World 
Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (“Pan Am”), directly 
addressed whether terrorism was excluded by standard policy
language.8  On September 6, 1970, Pan Am flight 083 was hijacked 
over London.9  Two men, acting on behalf of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),10 seized control of the plane 
and forced the crew to fly to Beirut.11  After an explosives expert 
boarded the plane in Beirut, the hijackers directed the crew to fly 
the plane to Cairo.12  In Cairo, the hijackers evacuated the
passengers and destroyed the plane.13
The issue in Pan Am was whether the hijacking qualified for 
any of the exclusions contained in a group of identical all-risk
aviation policies.14  The relevant exclusions stated:
c.  This policy does not cover anything herein to the 
contrary notwithstanding loss or damage due to or
resulting from:
1.  capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detention or the 
consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat, or any 
taking of the property insured or damage to or
BU 00 01 (1976)).
6. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad Claims, 
Multiple Lines, Arguments Over Occurrence Counting, War Risk Exclusions, the Future of 
Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Government Role, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 817, 844 
(2002).  It also includes certain losses that are unrelated to war. See Blaine 
Richards & Co. v. Marine Indem. Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 1051 (2d Cir. 1980). 
7. Id.
8. 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
9. Id. at 993.
10. The PFLP was the second largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization during the 1970s. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/
profiles/1604540.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).  Founded in 1967, the PFLP 
combined Arab nationalism with Marxist Leninist ideology. Id.
11. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d at 993.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
3
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destruction thereof by any Government or governmental 
authority or agent (whether secret or otherwise) or by any 
military, naval or usurped power, whether any of the 
foregoing be done by way of requisition or otherwise and 
whether in time of peace or war and whether lawful or 
unlawful (this subdivision 1. shall not apply, however, to 
any such action by a foreign government or foreign
governmental authority follow-the [sic] forceful diversion 
to a foreign country by any person not in lawful
possession or custody of such insured aircraft and who is 
not an agent or representative, secret or otherwise, of any 
foreign government or governmental authority) . . .;
2. war, invasion, civil war, revolution, rebellion,
insurrection or warlike operations, whether there be a 
declaration of war or not . . .;
3.   strikes, riots, civil commotion . . . .15
The court examined the three exclusions and decided that 
none applied to the hijacking.16  Regarding the first exclusion, the 
court stated that in order to constitute a military or usurped power 
within the meaning of the exclusion, there must at least be action 
by a de facto government.17  The court then explained that the 
PFLP was not a de facto government in the sky over London at the 
time of the hijacking.18  Thus, the loss of the plane was not due to 
or resulting from a military or usurped power within the meaning 
of the exclusion.19
Similarly, the second exclusion did not apply to the hijacking.20
Again, the court took the position that the PFLP was not a de facto 
government in the context of war.21  The court observed that case 
law established that war is a course of hostility engaged in by 
entities that have “significant attributes of sovereignty.”22  The court 
reasoned that the PFLP could not have been acting on behalf of 
any of the states in which the PFLP existed when it hijacked the 
plane,23 because those states uniformly opposed the hijacking.24
The court acknowledged that war could exist between quasi-
15. Id. at 994.
16. Id. at 1009-22.
17. Id. at 1009.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1012-19.
21. Id. at 1013.
22. Id. at 1012.
23. The PFLP existed in Jordan and Lebanon at the time. Id. at 1010.
24. Id. at 1013.
4
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sovereign entities, such as guerrilla groups.25  The court, however, 
stated that a guerrilla group must have at least some sovereignty 
before its activity can be called a war.26  The facts of the case did not 
indicate that the PFLP was a quasi-sovereign entity.27
The court also rejected the idea that the hijacking was a 
warlike operation,28 basing its position on the following factors:
“The hijackers did not wear insignia.  They did not openly carry 
arms.  Their acts had criminal rather than military overtones.  They 
were the agents of a radical political group, rather than a sovereign
government.”29  The court held that the hijacking was not an 
incidence of insurrection within the meaning of the second
exclusion.30
Reviewing the final exclusion, the court held that the hijacking 
was not a riot or civil commotion.31  The court ultimately found 
coverage under the policies.32
The court in Pan Am did not expressly discuss a public policy 
rationale behind its holding.  One commentator, however,
explained that the purpose of the war risk exclusion is inconsistent 
with the exclusion of terrorist attacks:
[t]he purpose of the war risk exclusion is to prevent 
insurers from being wiped out by correlated claims (those 
emanating from one source or affecting a discrete group 
rather than a cross-section or large population) that inflict 
abnormal losses throughout society.  An act of terrorism, 
even repeated acts of terrorism, does not inflict the
countrywide correlated losses of a state of armed conflict 
(be it civil commotion, insurrection, civil war, or war 
between established nations).  Even where the conflict
does not involve conventional troops or established
government, there is a difference between the occasional 
act of terror (e.g., a car bomb at a Jerusalem intersection) 
and the hostilities of insurrection, militias, or guerrilla
troops (e.g., raids throughout the countryside in Peru by 
the Shining Path rebels).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1015.  Although the PFLP received financial support from Arab 
states, this fact was not sufficient to establish the PFLP as a quasi-sovereign entity.
Id.  No Arab state recognized the PFLP. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1018.
31. Id. at 1019-22.
32. Id. at 1022.
5
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Although terrorist initiatives make normal loss prediction 
much more difficult, they do not pose the same risk 
calculation and risk distribution problems presented by 
more dispersed, semi-constant war.  Although terrorism 
can of course strike anywhere or anytime, it tends not to 
engulf or affect entire regions on a sustained basis.33
III. THE EFFECT OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. The September 11 Attack
On the morning of September 11, 2001, terrorists affiliated 
with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization hijacked four
passenger jets within the United States.  The terrorists flew two of 
the jets into the north and south towers of the World Trade Center 
in Manhattan, and caused the towers to collapse.34  The terrorists 
flew the third jet into the Pentagon.  The forth jet crashed in rural 
Pennsylvania.  Approximately 3,000 people died in the September 
11 attack.  Monetary losses are estimated to total between $35 
billion and $75 billion.35
B. September 11 and the Insurance Industry
1. War Risk Exclusion
In the wake of the September 11 attack, there was general 
concern that some insurers might attempt to deny coverage under 
existing policies by invoking the war risk exclusion.36  On
September 17, 2001, members of the U.S. House Financial Services 
Committee sent a letter to the National Association of Insurance 
33. Stempel, supra note 6, at 852.
34. See, e.g., WILLIAM LAUGEWIESCHE, AMERICAN GROUND (2002).
35. Mark A. Hofmann & Meg Fletcher, Loss Picture Still Unclear, BUS. INS.,
Sept. 9, 2002, at 10.
36. The insurance industry would have had to rely on the war risk exclusion
because most policies did not contain express terrorism exclusions.  Even after 
Pan Am, terrorism exclusions were not added to policies because of “the
competitiveness of the market, the perception of adequate protection created by 
complex ceding and retrocession arrangements, and the failure of actuarial worst-
case maximum liability models to contemplate a terrorism-generated clash event 
of such gigantic proportions.”  Jane Kendell, The Incalculable Risk: How the World 
Trade Center Disaster Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclusions, 36 U.
RICH. L. REV. 569, 581-82 (2002).
6
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Commissioners (“NAIC”).37  The government’s use of war–like
language in response to the attack was asserted to be simply
rhetoric and not a reflection of the reality of the attack.38  The 
letter stated that it would be unpatriotic of insurers to try to avoid 
coverage of the attack based on “legal maneuvering.”39  State 
insurance commissions agreed.  For example, on September 24, 
2001, Minnesota Commerce Commissioner Jim Bernstein issued 
the following press release, warning insurers not to deny coverage 
based on the war risk exclusion:
Since the tragic events of September 11, concerns have 
been raised that insurance companies may try to invoke 
an “act of war exclusion” in the insurance policies
covering the loss of life and property that resulted from 
these horrific attacks.  As Minnesota’s insurance
regulator, it is clear to me that these exclusions cannot, 
and should not, be applied in this case . . ..  [I]t seems 
clear that the attacks in New York, on the Pentagon, or on 
the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania, do not constitute 
“acts of war” as contemplated by the language of these 
exclusions.  An “act of war” must be committed by a 
foreign government, a sovereign, or at least a
recognizable authority utilizing military force.
. . .
However, in the event that an insurer were to attempt to 
take unfair advantage of its policyholders by hiding
behind an act of war exclusion, I will not hesitate to 
intervene.  I will call upon every resource available to me 
to guarantee that every insurance company under the 
authority of this Department fulfills its contractual, moral, 
and patriotic obligations to those who suffered loss of life 
or property as a result of these tragic events.40
In the face of such pressure, insurance industry leaders
announced that their companies would not deny coverage based 
37. Officials Ponder Reopening of Reagan Airport, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH,
Sept. 19, 2001, at A7.  The NAIC is the organization of insurance regulators from
the fifty states, Washington D.C., and the U.S. territories. See http://www.naic.org.
Insurance is largely regulated at the state level, as opposed to Congressional 
control. See, e.g., McCarren-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2002).
38. Officials Ponder Reopening, supra note 37.
39. Id.
40. Press Release, Minnesota Commerce Commissioner Jim Berstein,
Insurance Policy “Act of War” Exclusion (Sept. 24, 2001), available at
http://www.commerce.state.mn.us/pages/NewsReleases/Releases2001/News0109
24.htm.
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on the war risk exclusion.41
2. Terrorism Exclusion
Although it is believed that insurers have not denied coverage 
under existing policies based on the war risk exclusion, the industry 
quickly moved to add an express terrorism exclusion to new
policies and policies due to be renewed.42  In November 2001, 
41. Joseph B. Treaster, After the Attacks: The Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2001, at C10.  During congressional hearings in October 2001, the chairman of 
General Re Corporation testified that he was “proud of the way [the insurance 
industry] stepped up to the losses of September 11th without complaint.” The
Availability of Terrorism Insurance Coverage, Hearing Before the Senate Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Ronald E. Ferguson, 
Chairman, General Re Corp.).
One commentator has observed that “[i]n light of the history of war-risk
exclusion litigation, insurers can hardly be accused of making a gratuitous gesture 
in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy.”  Stempel, supra note 6, at 857-58.
This commentator argues that the insurers would have lost had Pan Am had been 
applied to the September 11 attack:
The September 11 terrorists did not want to conquer the United States
(war), depose the government (insurrection) or support a faction 
during domestic strife (civil war).  The September 11 terrorism, despite 
its awful magnitude, is more properly seen as a gruesomely heightened 
version of the Pan Am hijacking rather than as an incident of war.
. . .
If anything, one can characterize the September 11 hijackers as less 
political than those who took the Pan Am plane thirty years earlier.
Id. at 853, 858.
The commentator further noted that the insurance industry has not
changed the wording of the war risk exclusion since Pan Am. Id. at 861.  If 
insurers meant to include terrorism in the war risk exclusion, they could have 
changed its wording after Pan Am.  Id.  Not all commentators agree that the 
insurers would have lost under Pan Am.  For instance, another commentator has 
argued that September 11 was an act of war:
The events of September 11 involved the use of hijacked commercial 
airliners as weapons to attack civilian and military targets on sovereign 
American territory.  The only analogous action in modern times is the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  Both involved the use of airplanes as 
weapons to attack the United States, rather than as the target of the 
attack as in Pan Am.
. . .
An attack by one nation on the people and sovereign territory of 
another nation is an act of war because the essence of war is the 
invasion of another country.
Annemarie Sedore, War Risk Exclusions in the 21st Century: Applying War Risk 
Exclusions to the Attacks of September 11th, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1041, 1047-48 (2002).
42. Without insurance coverage for terrorist attacks, the sole means by which 
property owners could recoup their losses would be civil litigation against the 
terrorists and their supporters. See, e.g., Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2002) 
8
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Insurance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”) filed endorsements that 
insurers could use to exclude coverage for terrorism in both their 
commercial property and liability forms.43  The proposed exclusion 
defines a terrorist act is as follows:
[t]errorism means activities against persons, organizations 
or property of any nature:
(1) that involve the following or preparation for the 
following:
• use or threat of force or violence; or
• commission or threat of a dangerous act; or
• commission or threat of an act that interferes with or 
disrupts an electronic, communication, information or 
mechanical system; and
(2) when one or both of the following applies:
• the effect is to intimidate or coerce a government or 
the civilian population or any segment thereof, or to 
disrupt any segment of the economy; or
• it appears that the intent is to intimidate or coerce a 
government, or to further political, ideological,
religious, social or economic objectives or to express (or 
express opposition to) a philosophy or ideology.44
ISO subsequently amended its filing to narrow the application 
of the terrorism exclusion by establishing a $25 million damage 
threshold for the exclusion to take effect.45  This threshold did not 
apply in cases of terrorist attacks using nuclear, chemical, or
biological materials.46  Such attacks were entirely excluded from 
coverage.47  The endorsement for liability coverage provided an 
(providing that “[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, 
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism . . . may sue 
therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover
threefold the damages he or she sustains”); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2002); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst.,
291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 for 
funding a foreign terrorist organization).
43. Press Release, Insurance Services Organization, ISO Gratified by
Insurance Regulators’ Call for Approval of Terrorism Exclusions (Dec. 21, 2001) 
available at http://www.iso.com/press_releases/2001/12_21_01.html. (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2003).  ISO produces standardized policy contract language for the 
property/casualty insurance industry. See http://www.iso.com.
44. RICHARD J. HILLMAN, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TERRORISM
INSURANCE: RISING UNINSURED EXPOSURE TO ATTACKS HEIGHTENS POTENTIAL
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES 17-18 (2002).
45. Press Release, supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. HILLMAN, supra note 44, at 19.
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additional threshold for serious physical injury to fifty or more 
persons.48  If either threshold was met or exceeded, the exclusion 
would apply, and the policy would not cover any loss.49  On 
December 21, 2001, ISO announced that the NAIC had agreed to 
the wording of the exclusion. 50
Most states reacted to the new terrorism exclusion with
approval, although the approval was often qualified.51  For instance, 
on January 16, 2002, the Minnesota Department of Commerce 
issued a memorandum to all property and casualty insurance
companies licensed to do business in Minnesota regarding the new 
terrorism exclusion.52  The memo announced that the Commerce 
Department would accept the exclusionary language developed by 
ISO.53  The Commerce Department, however, would not accept 
terrorism exclusions for use with personal lines insurance products 
written in Minnesota.54  The Commerce Department also limited 
insurers’ use of the exclusion for commercial lines products written 
in Minnesota to those where the companies were unable to obtain 
reinsurance for damages resulting from acts of terrorism.55  Finally, 
the memorandum stated that if the federal government established 
a program providing reinsurance for terrorism coverage, insurers 
would be required to withdraw any corresponding exclusionary 
language.56
By February 22, 2002, 45 states, plus the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico, had approved the new terrorism exclusion.57  The 
remaining states expressed concerns such as:
48. Press Release, supra note 43.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. HILLMAN, supra note 44, at 5.  Several states issued bulletins granting 
conditional approval to the exclusion but adding a sunset provision based on the 
passage of a federal backstop law.  For Status of Terrorism Filing, see ISO Web site, 
at http://www.iso.com/filings/update.html.
52. Memorandum from the Minnesota Department of Commerce, Policy 
Analysis Division, Property and Casualty Section to All Property and Casualty 
Insurance Companies and Rate Service Organizations Licensed to Do Business in 
Minnesota (Jan. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.commerce.state.mn.us/pages/Insurance/P-C/terrorism.pdf
(last visited Feb. 3, 2003). 
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 1.  Personal lines typically refer to home- and automobile-related
coverage.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. HILLMAN, supra note 44, at 5.
10
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The low thresholds for the exclusion ($25 million or 50 
serious casualties); the all-or-nothing nature of the
threshold (insurers pay nothing if either threshold is 
reached); the aggregation of all losses from multiple 
incidents within a 72-hour period and across most of 
North America into one event if they “appear to be
carried out in concert or to have a related purpose or 
common leadership;” fear that the exclusion would leave 
some small and medium-size businesses that could least 
afford the losses from a terrorist attack totally
unprotected; and worry that the included definition of 
terrorism is overly broad.58
3. Federal Backstop Program
Insurers did not limit their efforts to excluding terrorism 
coverage from new and renewing policies.  Insurers also lobbied 
Congress for a federal backstop program.59  Under such a program, 
the federal government would act as an insurer, providing coverage 
for terrorism.60  Congress held hearings on the issue in late
October 2001.61  With industry executives, academics, and public 
officials providing testimony at the hearings, three questions
emerged: (1) whether the insurance industry could survive
September 11, (2) whether the federal government should be 
involved in the insurance business, and (3) who would benefit from 
a federal backstop program.62
With regard to the first question, members of the insurance 
industry posited that the losses generated by the September 11 
attack threatened the survival of the insurance industry.  For 
instance, Robert E. Vagley, President of the American Insurance
Association, testified that the September 11 attack were the most 
costly insured event in history.63  He stated that losses would exceed 
the entire property/casualty industry’s net income for the previous 
three years.64  In other words, September 11 wiped out three years 
58. Id.
59. Hearing on the Treasury Dep’t, Before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2001).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Terrorism Insurance, Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Comm., 107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Robert E. Vagley, 
President, American Insurance Association).
64. Id. at 2.
11
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of industry profits, including investment income.65
The NAIC took the opposite position, arguing that the
insurance industry was well capitalized and able to withstand claims 
from the September 11 attack.66  Diane Koken, Chair of the NAIC’s 
Northeast Zone, testified, “[t]he United States insurance industry is 
a $1 trillion business with assets of more than $3 trillion.
Preliminary loss estimates of $30 billion to $40 billion represent 
just 3 to 4 percent of the premiums written in 2000.”67  Senator Bill 
Nelson of Florida took a similar position.  He stated that the 
surplus in property and casualty lines was between $300 billion and 
$350 billion, that the overall insurance industry surplus was about 
$550 billion, and that the industry had about $3 trillion worth of 
assets.68  Furthermore, Koken pointed out that the insurance 
industry has historically shown itself able to respond to huge
disasters.69  For example, during the 1980’s and 1990’s, claims 
relating to asbestos, medical malpractice, and environmental
pollution were unforeseen by the insurance industry.70  The
industry was nevertheless able to weather these large financial 
losses.71
With regard to the second question, David A. Moss, Associate 
Professor at Harvard Business School, testified that government has 
long been involved with private sector risk.72  He said, “[t]he 
prospect of involving the federal government in the management 
of terror related risks would in no way constitute a radical
departure from the path of American policymaking.”73  He gave 
several successful examples of government involvement in risk 
management, including limited liability loss, federal deposit
insurance, and the cap on credit card liability.74  Moss also noted, 
65. Id.
66. The Role of the Federal Government in Assuring that Insurance for Terrorist Acts 
Remains Available to American Consumers, Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science 
and Transportation Comm., 107th Cong. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement 
of Diane Koken, Commissioner of Insurance, Pennsylvania).
67. Id. at 3.
68. Hearing on the Treasury Dep’t, Before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator).
69. Hearings, supra note 66.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id.
72. The Future of Insuring Terrorism Risks, Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of David A. Moss, 
Associate Professor, Harvard Business School).
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id.
12
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however, that federal disaster policy has encouraged construction
in hazard-prone areas.75  Similarly, the National Taxpayers Union 
(“NTU”)76 argued that a federal backstop program would create 
moral and security hazards.77  The NTU argued that such
legislation would remove any incentive to underwrite risks with any
caution, to avoid concentrated risks, or to help clients reduce risk.78
The third question generated some of the most heated
comments.  Senator Jim Bunning of Kentucky stated that he had 
“real problems with the federal government guaranteeing profits 
for insurance and reinsurance companies.”79  In contrast, the CEO 
of Kemper Insurance Companies took the position that the
legislation would not be a bailout for the insurance industry.80  He 
argued the primary beneficiaries of the legislation would be
insurance customers and the U.S. economy.81  Similarly, the
American Counsel for Capital Formation (“ACCF”)82 urged that if 
state insurance regulators refused to permit insurers to exclude 
terrorism coverage, insurers might withdraw completely from those 
states, thereby hurting local businesses.83  The ACCF also argued 
that apartment residents would suffer higher housing costs because 
real estate operating expenses would rise without terrorism
insurance.84  The ACCF predicted that rising operating costs would 
be passed on to low and moderate-income families.85
The House introduced a federal backstop bill on November 1, 
75. Id.
76. The NTU lobbies Congress regarding fiscal and economic policy. See
http://www.ntu.org.
77. Proposals for Terrorism Reinsurance, Hearing Before the House Financial Services 
Comm., 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of David L. Keating, Senior Counselor, 
National Taxpayers Union).
78. Id.
79. Hearing on the Treasury Dep’t, supra note 68 (statement of Jim Bunning, 
U.S. Senator).
80. Insurance and Terrorism, Hearing Before the House Financial Services Comm.,
107th Cong. 5 (2001) (statement of David B. Mathis, Chairman and CEO, Kemper 
Insurance Cos.).
81. Id.
82. The ACCF, composed of organizations such as the National Apartment
Association and the National Association of Realtors, states that its mission is “to 
promote the saving and investment essential to economic growth, job creation, 
and international competitiveness.” See http://www.accf.org/Mission.htm.
83. Terrorism Risk, Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of American Council for Capital
Formation).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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2001, but it was not immediately made into law.  The Consumer 
Federation of America86 issued a report in January 2002 entitled 
How the Lack of Federal Backup for Terrorism Insurance has Affected
Insurers and Consumers: An Analysis of Market Conditions and Policy
Implications.87  In the report, the CFA came to five major
conclusions about the current state of the insurance market,
especially as it related to terrorism coverage.  First, the CFA 
concluded that the insurance industry was overcapitalized.88
Second, high insurance rates were a problem for mid- and larger-
size companies.89  Third, the economic cycle of the industry caused 
the rate problem, not solely the terrorist attack.90  Fourth, banks 
were loaning money to most businesses, despite the terrorism 
insurance situation.91  Fifth, there were “no widespread economic 
problems related to the terrorism insurance situation in America.”92
Based on these conclusions, the CFA urged Congress not to 
rush into passing a federal backup plan.93  It asked Congress not to 
provide the insurance industry with handouts.94  Instead, it
suggested that Congress create incentives for the development of 
private sector alternatives.95  In addition, the CFA recommended 
that Congress address rate gouging in any bill that passed.96
The CFA also made recommendations to the states.  It urged 
the states to reject exclusions for personal lines of coverage97 and 
for commercial lines for small and mid-sized insureds.98
86. The CFA is a pro-consumer advocacy and education organization. See
http://www.consumerfed.org.
87. J. ROBERT HUNTER, HOW THE LACK OF FEDERAL BACKUP FOR TERRORISM
INSURANCE HAS AFFECTED INSURERS AND CONSUMERS: AN ANALYSIS OF MARKET
CONDITIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2002).  In October of 2001, the CFA had 
announced that it supported a federal reinsurance program for terrorism.
Terrorism Insurance, Hearing Before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, 
Consumer Federation of America).
88. HUNTER, supra note 87, at 11.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 10-11.
94. Id. at 11.  The CFA stated that “[i]f any federal back up is enacted, it 
should be a loan program modeled after the House bill, not a give away program 
that does not require . . . assistance to be paid back.” Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Id.
98. Id.
14
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Additionally, the CFA urged states to review pricing in the
marketplace to prevent price gouging.99  The CFA was particularly 
concerned about non-terror rates for smaller and mid-sized
commercial insureds.100
One month after the CFA issued its report, the General 
Accounting Office (“GAO”)101 produced its own report on
terrorism and insurance, entitled Rising Uninsured Exposure to
Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerability.102  The purpose of 
the report was to describe to Congress “how, in the absence of 
federal action, insurance companies and the marketplace have 
reacted to the events of September 11th.”103  The report was based 
on discussions with insurance industry participants, regulators, 
policyholders, and other affected parties.104  These sources spoke to 
the GAO on condition of anonymity because they feared the 
consequences of their lack of terrorism coverage becoming
common knowledge.105
The GAO’s report opened by explaining that prior to
September 11, 2001, insured losses resulting from terrorism in the 
United States were extremely infrequent.106  Because their
experience with terrorism was limited, it was virtually impossible for 
insurers to set actuarially sound prices for terrorism coverage after 
September 11.107  As a result, many insurers considered terrorism 
an uninsurable risk and decided not to offer insurance for it.108  As 
insurance contracts came up for renewal, reinsurers and insurers 
took the opportunity to reduce their exposure to terrorism risk.109
Most reinsurance contracts expired at the beginning of January 
2002.110
In contrast to reinsurance contracts, regular insurance
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id.
101. The GAO is the investigative arm of Congress. See http://www.gao.gov.
The GAO “exists to support the Congress in meeting its Constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the
accountability of the federal government for the American people.” Id.
102. See HILLMAN, supra note 44.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 4.  There are two kinds of reinsurance contracts: treaty and
facultative.  Treaty reinsurance is usually on going. Id.
15
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contracts were eligible for renewal at various dates throughout the 
year.111  Therefore, when reinsurers withdrew from the market at 
the beginning of the year, many direct insurers’ exposures
increased dramatically because the primary insurance contracts 
were not scheduled for renewal until a later date.112  Also, unlike 
reinsurance, changes to the coverage provided by direct insurers 
require regulatory approval in most states.113  Direct insurers had to 
overcome this additional hurdle to drop terrorism coverage and 
limit their exposure to loss.114
As the insurance industry limited its exposure to terrorism 
risks, the economic burden of a terrorist attack shifted to
policyholders.115  Some property owners and developers have had to 
go without insurance or partially insure assets because they were 
unable to obtain meaningful terrorism coverage.116  Even when 
limited coverage was available, insurers set premiums high because
of uncertainties about the frequency and cost of terrorist attacks.117
In addition to fears regarding their personal liability for terrorist 
attacks on their properties, property owners also faced problems 
because lenders required insurance coverage on the collateral that 
backed existing mortgage loans.118  Based on the above, the GAO’s 
report concluded the “resulting economic drag could slow
economic recovery and growth.”119
On August 22, 2002, the CFA revisited the issue of terrorism 
insurance and updated its previous positions on how the lack of a 
federal backup program for terrorism insurance was affecting 
insurers and consumers.120  The CFA concluded that a broad-based
terrorism insurance crisis did not exist.121  Rather, it observed that 
the capacity to write insurance had increased.122  The CFA stated 
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 4-5.  Reinsurers are generally subject to less state regulation than 
insurers. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 70A.02 subd. 2(2) (2002) (excluding reinsurance 
from form and rate regulation).
114. HILLMAN, supra note 44, at 5.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 2.
120. J. ROBERT HUNTER, HOW THE LACK OF FEDERAL BACK UP FOR TERRORISM
INSURANCE HAS AFFECTED INSURERS AND CONSUMERS: AN UPDATE (2002).
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id. at 3-4.
16
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that terrorism coverage was available in most cases.123  In addition, 
rates were stabilizing and increases were starting to slow.124  Finally, 
the CFA took the position that “terror insurance availability [was] 
having virtually no impact on lending.”125
Again, the CFA recommended that Congress refrain from 
enacting a broad backup bill126 and giving handouts to insurers,127
while creating incentives for the development of private-sector
alternatives,128 and addressing rate gouging.129  The CFA also urged 
the states to do more to stop price gouging by insurers.130
The CFA concluded its August report by forcefully expressing 
its opposition to the proposed federal backstop legislation, which 
the Senate passed in June 2002:
Insurers have offered absolutely no evidence to justify 
exposing taxpayers to significant financial risk in the
event of future terrorism losses.  Taxpayers are already 
100% liable for attacks on government facilities, like the 
Pentagon, and 35% exposed to all other terrorist losses 
(because of the corporate tax write-off rate).  To go 
further when the private market is largely covering
terrorism risks is inappropriate and wasteful . . ..  To 
provide federal backup for these risks is not only
unnecessary, but would provide insurers with a
windfall . . ..  Congress should limit taxpayer exposure to 
areas of real need, such as very large commercial and real 
estate risks.131
Insurer and policyholder groups strongly disagreed with the 
CFA.132  These groups argued that any available terrorism insurance 
was limited in terms of capacity and coverage.133  Even if coverage 
was available, it was too expensive to be within reach of most 
buyers.134  In addition, buyer and insurer groups argued that
without a federal coverage backstop, another terrorist attack would 
123. Id. at 5-6.
124. Id. at 7-8.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id. at 10.
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 12.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Gavin Souter, Buyers, Insurers Rebut CFA Report on Terrorism Cover, BUS. INS.,
Aug. 26, 2002, at 1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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devastate the insurance market.135
IV. THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002
On November 26, 2002, the President signed the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) into law.136  TRIA came into being 
nearly one year after the House passed a terrorism insurance bill 
that would have allowed the federal government to lend money to 
insurers after a terrorist attack, as long as the insurers paid back the 
government.137  The House bill protected property owners against 
punitive damages.138  The Senate did not pass its version of the bill 
until June due to disputes over whether it should contain certain
so-called tort reforms.139  Under the Senate version, insurers and 
the federal government would share the cost of terrorist attacks 
and insurers would not be required to pay back the government’s 
share.140  The only tort reform included in the Senate bill was a 
prohibition against using federal funds to pay punitive damages.141
President Bush believed that the bill would revive the
economy, and the administration became involved in the
negotiations over the bill.142  The administration favored tort
limitations and cost sharing.143  Progress on the bill was stalled until 
the administration agreed to drop its push for the inclusion of tort 
reforms.144  Congressional Democrats, in turn, agreed to the
consolidation of multiple lawsuits for property loss, personal injury 
or death from terrorist attacks in one federal district court.145
A. Main Features of TRIA
TRIA nullifies all existing terrorism exclusions146 and requires 
all property and casualty insurers to offer terrorism insurance for 
135. Id.
136. Pub. L. No. 107-297, tit. 1, § 101-08 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
6701).
137. Mark A. Hofmann & Jerry Geisel, Terror Cover Deal Reached, BUS. INS.,
Oct. 21, 2002, at 1-4.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 105(a).
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the next two years.147  The Treasury Secretary148 may extend the 
requirement by an additional year.149  Under TRIA, the coverage 
offered for terrorism cannot materially differ from other types of 
coverage.150  If states determine the rates charged by insurers for 
terrorism insurance are too high, the states can invalidate those 
rates.151  TRIA permits policyholders to decline to purchase
terrorism coverage.152  Insurers must disclose the premiums
charged to policyholders for terrorism coverage within time limits 
specified by the statute.153
To activate the federal backstop program under TRIA, the 
following requirements must be met.  First, the event causing the 
loss must be certified as a foreign act of terrorism.154  Second, the 
147. Id. § 103(c).  TRIA defines an insurer as
any entity, including any affiliate thereof—
(A) that is—
(i) licensed or admitted to engage in the business of providing 
primary or excess insurance in any State;
(ii) not licensed or admitted as described in clause (i), if it is an 
eligible surplus line carrier listed on the Quarterly Listing of Alien 
Insurers of the NAIC, or any successor thereto;
(iii) approved for the purpose of offering property and casualty 
insurance by a Federal agency in connection with maritime, energy, or 
aviation activity;
(iv) a State residual market insurance entity or State workers’
compensation fund; or
(v) any other entity described in section 103(f), to the extent
provided in the rules of the Secretary issued under section 103(f);
(B) that receives direct earned premiums for any type of commercial 
property and casualty insurance coverage, other than in the case of 
entities described in sections 103(d) and 103(f); and
(C) that meets any other criteria that the Secretary may reasonably 
prescribe.
Id. § 102(6).  TRIA does not cover reinsurers.  Reinsurers are nevertheless affected 
by TRIA because reinsurers support primary insurers.  Janina Clark, US Terror Bill 
Slows Renewals, REINS. MAG., Dec. 16, 2002, at 1.
148. The Department of the Treasury administers the program.  Pub. L. No. 
107-297 § 103(a)(1).
149. Id. § 103(c)(2).
150. Id. § 103(c)(1)(B).
151. Id. § 106(a)(2)(B).
152. Id. § 105(c).
153. Id. § 103(b)(2).
154. Id. § 102(1)(A).  An act of terrorism is defined under the act as:
any act that is certified by the Secretary, in concurrence with the 
Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of the United States—
(i) to be an act of terrorism;
19
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losses from the event must be in excess of $5 million.155  Third, the 
insurer must pay a deductible.156
After the insurer pays the deductible, the government pays 
90% of the remaining loss and the insurer pays the other 10%.157
The program has a one-year cap of $100 billion.158  If the total 
annual losses are greater than $100 billion, Congress can decide 
who will pay the rest of the losses and how much.159  The
government is permitted to recoup its payments through
surcharges on policyholders.160
(ii) to be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to—
(I) human life;
(II) property; or
(III) infrastructure;
(iii) to have resulted in damage within the United States, or outside of 
the United States in the case of—
(I) an air carrier or vessel described in paragraph (5)(B); or
(II) the premises of a United States mission; and
(iv) to have been committed by an individual or individuals acting on 
behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to 
coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the 
policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by 
coercion.
Id.
155. Id. § 102(1)(B)(ii).
156. Id. § 102(7).  The deductible varies depending on the time period in 
which the loss occurs.  From November 26, 2002 to December 31, 2002, the 
deductible is one percent of the value of the insurer’s directly earned premiums 
during the year preceding November 26, 2002. Id.  During 2003, the deductible is 
seven percent of the insurer’s directly earned premiums from the preceding year.
Id.  During 2004, the deductible is ten percent. Id.  If the program is extended to 
2005, the deductible is fifteen percent. Id.
157. Id. § 103(e)(1)(A).
158. Id. § 103(e)(2)(A).
159. Id. § 103(e)(3).
160. Id. § 103(e)(7).  The amount that the government can recoup is the 
difference between the insurance marketplace aggregate retention amount and 
the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured losses that are not compensated 
by the Federal Government because such losses—
(I) are within the insurer deductible for the insurer subject to the 
losses; or
(II) are within the portion of losses of the insurer that exceed the 
insurer deductible, but are not compensated pursuant to paragraph 
(1).
Id. § 103(e)(7)(A).
The insurance marketplace aggregate retention amount is
(A) for the period beginning on the first day of the Transition Period 
and ending on the last day of Program Year 1, the lesser of—
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/16
ALLYN CURRENT FORMATTED.DOC 2/22/2003 12:20 PM
2003] RISE AND FALL OF INSURANCE COVERAGE 841
TRIA makes a federal cause of action the exclusive remedy for 
claims arising out of a single act of terrorism.161  The law of the state 
in which the act of terrorism occurred will govern the substantive 
law of the case.162  A single district court will be assigned to have 
jurisdiction over all actions.163  Punitive damages are excluded from 
the calculation of insured losses.164
B. Implementation of TRIA
General confusion about the requirements of various
provisions of the law, especially the disclosure provisions followed
immediately after the passage of TRIA.165  The Treasury
Department issued interim guidelines to assist insurers with
compliance.166
(i) $ 10,000,000,000; and
(ii) the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured losses during 
such period;
(B) for Program Year 2, the lesser of—
(i) $ 12,500,000,000; and
(ii) the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured losses during 
such Program Year; and
(C) for Program Year 3, the lesser of—
(i) $ 15,000,000,000; and
(ii) the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured losses during 
such Program Year.
Id. § 103(e)(6).
Recoupment is not mandatory if uncompensated losses exceed the insurance 
marketplace aggregate retention amount. Id. § 103(e)(7)(B).
Insurers will collect the surcharges and remit them to the federal
government. Id. § 103(e)(8).  The surcharges may not exceed three percent of 
any policy’s annual premium. Id. § 103(e)(8)(C).
161. Id. § 107(a).  This venue provision appears to be modeled after the Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, which grants the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York exclusive jurisdiction over all 
actions brought for any claim resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related
aircraft crashed of September 11.  Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(3).
162. Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 107(a)(3).
163. Id. § 107(a)(4).
164. Id. § 107(a)(5).
165. Id. § 103(b)(2).
166. Treas. Dep’t Notice, Interim Guidance Concerning Certain Conditions for 
Federal Payment, Non-U.S. Insurers, and Scope of Insurance Coverage in the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (Jan. 22, 2003); Treas. Dep’t Notice, Interim Guidance 
Concerning Definition of Insurers, Scope of Insurance Coverage, and Disclosures Mandated 
by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (Dec. 18, 2002); Treas. Dep’t Notice, 
Interim Guidance Concerning New Statutory Disclosure and Mandatory Availability
21
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C. Mixed Reaction to TRIA
Although insurers lobbied heavily for TRIA, and passage of the 
bill was seen as a win for the commercial insurance industry,167
insurers nonetheless expressed concerns about TRIA as passed.
One of the objections was that TRIA forced insurers to take on 
greater risk.168  Prior to passage of TRIA, insurers were shedding 
coverage and reducing their exposure.169  Under TRIA, insurers 
had no choice but to offer coverage for those very risks.170
Another insurance industry objection was that the deductibles 
were too high.  Kemper Insurance Company’s William D. Smith, 
stated, “[t]he act doesn’t do us any good at all.”171  He was referring 
to the requirement that insurers pay a deductible before federal 
money becomes available.172  The deductible, asserted Smith, would 
expose insurers to huge liability.173  He explained that under TRIA, 
if a terrorist attack took place within one year of passage, Kemper’s 
liability could reach $300 million.174  Other insurers complained 
the deductible was too high in the later stages of the program.175
These insurers described the deductible requirement as “more 
positive for the industry in the first year than in the second and 
third year[s].”176
The insurance industry also complained the law was unclear or 
incomplete about the lines of insurance and entities it was designed 
to protect.177  Finally, the industry voiced fears that TRIA could lead 
to more federal regulation.  After TRIA was passed, some states 
insisted on enforcing their own insurance laws and regulations, 
which sometimes conflicted with the federal law.178  For instance, 
Requirements of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (Dec. 3, 2002).
167. Jerry Geisel, Terror Backstop Clears House, BUS. INS., Nov. 18, 2002, at 1.
168. Clark, supra note 147.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Gavin Souter, Exposures Forcing Insurers to Keep Rates High, CEO Says, BUS.
INS., Dec. 23, 2002, at 3.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Michael Ha, Insurers Scrambling to Comply with New Terrorism Insurance Law,
NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAS. RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Dec. 2, 2002, at 5.
176. Id.
177. Meg Fletcher, States’ Laws Clash with Federal Terror Act, BUS. INS., Dec. 23, 
2002, at 2.
178. Id.
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Florida continued to maintain its ban on terrorism exclusions.179
Florida did not permit insureds to opt out of terrorism coverage 
because exclusions were not necessary; $100 billion of new
reinsurance capacity had been added.180  Therefore, policyholders 
in Florida could not opt out of coverage, as TRIA provided.181  The 
insurance industry was concerned that if the states did not respond 
in a uniform manner to the federal law, federal intervention would 
be likely.182
The business community also expressed concerns about TRIA.
For instance, TRIA does not cover acts of domestic terrorism.183
Accordingly, the Oklahoma City bombing would not have been 
covered.184  Another concern is that the law is not clear as to 
whether it covers damages from biological or chemical attacks.185
Insurers could argue these damages are environmental, and thus 
potentially prohibited by a policy’s pollution exclusion.186  The 
interplay between coverage for acts of terror and the war risk 
exclusion also raises questions.187  One possibility is that if Congress 
adopts a tough stance against rogue states and terrorism,
Congress’s action could be seen as a declared war.188  For instance, 
Congress passed a resolution authorizing military action against 
Iraq.189  If a domestic act of terror was linked to Iraq, insurers might 
argue that it comes within the war exclusion.190
TRIA’s effect on premium rates is still unclear.191  Some 
commentators predict that large insureds and insureds in urban 
areas would experience inflated premiums.192  Others discussed the 
possibility that insurers could artificially reduce rates by relying on 
179. Id.
180. Feds, States Eye Final Terror Regs, INS. CHRON., Dec. 30, 2002, at 1.
181. Fletcher, supra note 177.
182. Id.
183. Meg Fletcher, Terror Law Will Bring Challenges: Tough Choices Ahead, BUS.
INS., Nov. 4, 2002, at 1.
184. Id.
185. Early Verdict: Terror-Insurance Law Helping, COM. MORTGAGE ALERT, Dec. 6, 
2002.
186. Id.
187. Feds, States Eye Final Terror Regs, supra note 180.
188. Id.
189. Alison Mitchell & Carl Hulse, Congress Authorizes Bush to Use Force Against 
Iraq, Creating A Broad Mandate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at A1.
190. Feds, States Eye Final Terror Regs, supra note 180.
191. Ha, supra note 175.
192. Id.
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TRIA.193 Not long after the passage of TRIA, two insurers that had 
stopped offering terrorism coverage began to offer it again at 
prices substantially lower than previously offered, indicating that 
price gouging might not be an issue.194
Another reaction to TRIA was the development of new policy 
language by ISO195 and the American Association of Insurance 
Services.196  The new language stated the terrorism exclusion does 
not apply to a “certified” terrorism loss.197  Such a loss results from a 
certified act of terrorism, as defined in TRIA.198
V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of a terrorist attack, TRIA’s impact is difficult to 
gauge.  As Part IV indicates, many issues related to TRIA have yet to 
be resolved.  Over the coming months, the Treasury Department 
will likely address these issues and attempt to clarify them.  Some 
issues may not be resolved short of litigation.  Other issues,
currently unforeseen, will no doubt arise if terrorism activity
increases in the United States and insurers and the government 
have to pay for extensive losses.  The United States’ backstopping 
of casualty insurers’ terrorism coverage represents unusual federal 
involvement with an industry long resistant to federal control.  The 
exigencies of the times have brought together a partnership
deemed necessary to help protect the country’s economy.  Whether 
this precedent-setting program proves to be economically
necessary, or merely corporate welfare, will unfold over the next 
few years. 
193. Id.
194. Early Verdict, supra note 185.  For example, a large property insurer 
quoted a $112,000 annual premium with a $34,000 terrorism component for a $50 
million all-risk policy on a 400,000 square foot office building in the Bronx. Id.
Before passage of TRIA, the terrorism component alone would have cost more 
than $100,000. Id.
195. See http://www.iso.com.
196. American Association of Insurance Services develops products for
property/casualty insurers. See http://www.aaisonline.com.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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